Community land formalization and company land acquisition procedures by Notess, L. (Laura) et al.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Land Use Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/landusepol
Community land formalization and company land acquisition procedures: A
review of 33 procedures in 15 countries
Laura Notessa, Peter Veitb,*, Iliana Monterrosoc, Andikod, Emmanuel Sullee, Anne M. Larsonc,
Anne-Sophie Gindrozf, Julia Quaedvliegh, Andrew Williamsg
a Centre for Law and Democracy, Canada
bWorld Resources Institute (WRI), USA
c Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Peru
dAsM Law Office, Indonesia
e Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS), University of the Western Cape, South Africa
f Rights and Resources Initiative (RRI), Indonesia
gNational Forestry Authority, Uganda
h International Institute of Social Studies (ISS), The Netherlands
A R T I C L E I N F O
Keywords:
Indigenous and community land
Customary land rights
Formalization
Company land acquisition
A B S T R A C T
Indigenous and community lands, crucial for rural livelihoods, are typically held under informal customary
tenure arrangements. This can leave the land vulnerable to outside commercial interests, so communities may
seek to formalize their land rights in a government registry and obtain an official land document. But this process
can be time-consuming and complex, and in contrast, companies can acquire land relatively quickly and find
shortcuts around regulatory burdens. This article reviews and maps 19 community land formalization and 14
company land acquisition procedures is 15 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Comparing community
and company procedures identifies multiple sources of inequity.
1. Introduction
As global demand for foods, fuels, minerals, fibers, and other nat-
ural resources grows, land acquisitions are on the rise around the world
(World Bank, 2017). Companies and investors are increasingly seeking
to acquire land for long periods of time. As this competition intensifies,
land that communities, including Indigenous Peoples (hereafter com-
munities) hold under customary tenure arrangements1 is vulnerable to
acquisition by powerful political and economic elites, particularly if the
land rights are not entered in a government registry or cadaster and the
government has not issued the community an official document, such as
a land certificate or title (Alden Wily, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c; Anseeuw
et al., 2011).
While customary tenure systems historically provided communities
with tenure security, the growing threats are leading to new insecurity
(Chimhowu, 2019; Alden Wily, 2011b). Many communities across
Africa, Latin America, and Asia are applying for formal land rights to
integrate their customary rights into official legal systems and to pro-
tect their lands. The stakes are high, given that more than 50 percent of
the world’s land is community land and as many as 2.5 billion people
depend heavily on these lands for their livelihood (Pearce, 2016). Even
where formalization is not needed for legal recognition, communities
are registering their land to “double-lock” their rights (Alden Wily,
2017). While formalization is not a guarantee of tenure security and can
bring challenges (e.g., property taxes), for many communities facing
growing threats to their customary land, the benefits now outweigh the
costs.
Globally, national laws recognize just 10 percent of land as be-
longing to communities, and another 8 percent is designated by gov-
ernments for community use (RRI, 2015). Further, not all legally-re-
cognized community land is registered and documented. Community
land formalization is rarely a government priority (RRI, 2017). In many
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countries, national laws do not recognize collectively-held land or es-
tablish a formalization procedure (Alden Wily, 2017). Where such
procedures are in place, the law is often poorly implemented (RRI,
2015). Many governments consider community land, especially the
common property (e.g., forests, pastures, and wetlands), to be vacant,
idle, and underused (Alden Wily, 2011a; De Schutter, 2011). For many
officials, the promise of economic growth and foreign exchange trumps
community land rights and justifies allocating this land to companies
for investment purposes (Anseeuw et al., 2011).
Formal land documents can help communities convince others of
their legal rights, ensuring that they will be recognized and respected
by others. They can be used as evidence of legal possession in a court of
law where they commonly carry more weight than oral testimony on
customary rights. Land titles can also provide communities critical
leverage in negotiations with outside investors (Knight, 2012).
Documented community land can also open opportunities for ac-
cessing project finance using channels other than credit. Governments
and banks fund against the viability and profitability of projects and
consider documented community land to be more secure than custo-
marily held land (Ding et al., 2017). In Mexico, the government sup-
ports community forest enterprises, but communities with any out-
standing land rights issues are not eligible to participate in such
government programs (Bray et al., 2006; Guerra, 2015).
Tenure security creates incentives for community members to make
land-related investments by providing them with high expectations of
rights over the returns (Bledsoe, 2006; Deininger, 2003; Deininger and
Feder, 2009). Coupled with other measures (e.g., payments for eco-
system services), tenure security can promote long-term investments by
communities in land stewardship that generate positive environment
and development outcomes. In Bolivia, Brazil, and Colombia, the
average annual deforestation rates on titled indigenous lands in the
Amazon are two to three times lower than in similar forestlands not
titled to Indigenous Peoples (Blackman and Veit, 2018). In the Peruvian
Amazon, formalizing indigenous lands significantly reduces forest
clearing and disturbance (Blackman et al., 2017).
Such investments can, in turn, enhance the productivity of the land,
boost farmer income, and discourage unsustainable practices
(Byamugisha and Fulgence, 2013; Knight, 2012; World Bank, 2018). In
Mexico, India, Nepal, and other countries, many communities with
documented land rights have established forest-based enterprises that
produce benefits for local producers and restore ecosystem services for
society (Hodgdon and Monzón, 2017; Hodgdon et al., 2013).
Understanding the challenges and opportunities for improving
community land formalization procedures is central to securing cus-
tomary lands and protecting rural livelihoods worldwide. To this end,
this research was designed to better understand procedural pathways
for communities and companies, and to assess whether communities
and companies are treated differently in the formalization process, and
why. This article provides the findings of a review of 33 community and
company procedures for acquiring formal land rights in 15 countries.
2. Methods
Data was collected on 19 community land formalization procedures
in 15 countries—five each in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Fig. 1).2
National laws were reviewed for all community procedures, and im-
plementation for 6 procedures (Table 1). In addition, 14 company land
acquisition procedures for agricultural, oil palm, forestry, tourism, or
general economic purposes were examined in 12 research countries.
The relevant laws were reviewed for all company procedures and
practice was investigated for 6 procedures (Table 2). All 33 procedures
examined are established in law and administered by the government.
The community procedures analyzed are the most common or, in
some cases, the only legally established procedures for registering and
documenting new community or preexisting customary land rights in
the research countries. All procedures provide communities with a
large, but not complete bundle of land rights. For example, no proce-
dure provides communities with commercial use rights over high-value
natural resources on or below their land (unlike company procedures).
Further, some formalization procedures do not provide communities
with rights in perpetuity, while others do not provide them with the
rights to sell or lease their lands. A few procedures (e.g., Indonesia and
India) focus on formalizing community tree and forest rights but were
included in this research because they also grant significant land rights.
All company land acquisition procedures examined are adminis-
tered by the government, including the principal procedures for ac-
quiring government and community land. While the granted bundle of
rights varies by procedure, all provide companies with some commer-
cial use rights. The research did not examine private market transac-
tions to purchase or lease privately held land (e.g., willing seller,
willing buyer transactions), compulsory land acquisition by the gov-
ernment and the subsequent transfer of this land to companies, and
illegal paths or procedures that are not established by law.
Data collection focused on eight key formalization issues (Box 1). To
help ensure consistency in data collection across informants, proce-
dures, and countries, multiple indicators for each issue were developed
and scored. Three issues - number of steps, cost in dollars, and cost in
time - are also used by the World Bank for measuring property regis-
tration in the annual Doing Business reports (World Bank, 2018).
Data was collected by reviewing the literature on community and
company procedures, and all relevant national (or federal) laws prior to
December 2017, including the constitution, statutes, regulations, and
court rulings of relevant cases, to the extent they were available.
Subnational laws and government policies and statements that are not
legally binding were not reviewed. Data was also collected by inter-
viewing national and international experts on community and company
procedures.
In addition, field research was conducted in Peru, Tanzania, and
Indonesia, involving semi-structured individual and group interviews
with stakeholders (e.g., government and company officials, local civil
society organization [CSO] and non-governmental organization [NGO]
leaders, and researchers). Site visits were also conducted to meet with
community leaders and villagers with experience in land formalization.
3. Key findings
This section provides key data findings for community and company
procedures.
3.1. Community land formalization procedures
3.1.1. Preconditions and steps
Often, communities must meet certain legal preconditions before
the formalization process can start. Preconditions typically include re-
quirements regarding the nature of eligible communities, such as in-
digenous status, or mandatory ties to the land. Ten of the 19 community
procedures are reserved for Indigenous Peoples, one for Quilombola
communities (Afro-Brazilian communities), and the remaining eight
apply to communities defined more broadly in national laws.
Communities must demonstrate historic ties to the land in 12 pro-
cedures with several defining what constitutes a historic link in light of
challenging evidentiary or other requirements. In Guyana, the com-
munity must consist of at least 150 persons and have existed for 25
years. In Chile, communities must possess a specific, historic govern-
ment document.
In 12 of the 19 procedures, communities must form a legal entity or
2 A community or company procedure is defined as a process that registers
land rights in government records and grants the community or investor a
unique legal document. Procedures were treated separately if recorded in a
different registry or conveyed via a different legal instrument.
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obtain government certification that they constitute a community. This
requirement varies in complexity but often, involves completing an
application, electing a village council, and drafting bylaws.
In practice, meeting preconditions can be burdensome, time con-
suming, and sometimes disqualifying for communities. Often govern-
ment policies or priorities create new preconditions beyond those re-
quired in law.
The number of steps and involved government agencies mandated
by law varies by procedure (Table 3). Typical steps include submitting
the application; notifying other agencies, the public, or neighbors; a
field visit or technical verification; surveying and/or boundary agree-
ment with neighbors; settling opposition to the application or disputes;
entry into an official registry; and issuance of a deed or certificate.
All procedures require mapping or surveying, of varying degrees of
technicality, except Chile (with no implementing regulations). Further,
all 19 procedures require some level of screening for third-party claims
via public notice followed by contestation periods, government ver-
ification for such claims, or alternate forums for oppositions to be
brought.
In practice, communities must complete additional steps in the 6
community procedures examined (no data was collected on demarca-
tion in Mozambique) (Table 4). Implementing authorities can add steps
in the form of non-binding guidelines or project-specific plans. Many
extra steps fill gaps in the law and may have been designed to reduce
the discretion of officials.
The total number of steps communities navigate highlights the
Fig. 1. Map of Research Countries.
Table 1
Community Land Formalization Procedures Reviewed.
Source: WRI.
COUNTRY PROCEDURE REVIEW OF LAW REVIEW OF PRACTICE
Brazil Collective Land Titling of Quilombolas •
Brazil Indigenous Territories •
Cambodia Collective Land Title •
Cameroon Land Title •
Chile Art. 20(b) Land Transfer •
Côte d'Ivoire Land Certificate •
Guyana Amerindian Land • •
India Community Forest Rights •
Indonesia Customary Forest • •
Mozambique Delimitation • •
Mozambique Demarcation •
Panama Indigenous Community Land Title •
Peru Native Community Land Title • •
Peru Usufruct Contract for Classified Forestland • •
Philippines Certificate of Ancestral Domain •
Papau New Guinea Registered Customary Land •
Tanzania Certificate of Village Land • •
Uganda Certificate of Customary Occupation •
Uganda Group Freehold •
TOTAL 19 6
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Table 2
Company Land Acquisition Procedures Reviewed.
Source: WRI
COUNTRY PROCEDURE REVIEW OF LAW REVIEW OF PRACTICE
Cambodia Economic Land Concessions •
Cameroon Provisional Concessions on National Land •
Côte d'Ivoire Emphyteutic Lease •
Guyana State Land Grant or Lease • •
Indonesia HGU Land Use Right/Palm Oil Plantations • •
Indonesia HTI/Industrial Forests • •
Mozambique DUAT Acquisition for Economic Purposes • •
Panama Concessions for Tourist Investment •
Peru Rights to Forests on Classified Agricultural Land • •
Philippines Lease of (Public) Alienable and Disposable Land •
Papau New Guinea SABL •
Tanzania Granted Right of Occupancy/Derivative Right • •
Uganda Freehold Land from District Land Board •
Uganda Grant/Leasehold from ULC •
TOTAL 14 6
Box 1
Eight Key Community Land Formalization and Company Land Acquisition Issues
PRECONDITIONS AND STEPS. * The eligibility criteria and preconditions to formalize land rights and the various steps and government
agencies involved in the procedures.
COST IN TIME. The cost in time to formalize land rights, including reasons for variations.
COST IN MONEY. The cost in money to formalize land rights, including reasons for variations.
LAND SIZE. The minimum and maximum amount of formal land set in the law and any floors or ceilings that exist in practice.
RIGHTS DURATION. The duration in time of the formal land rights in law and practice (e.g., granted in perpetuity or a set term).
RIGHTS GRANTED. The bundle of formal land rights granted in law and practice under each reviewed procedure.
RIGHTS MAINTENANCE. Affirmative obligations to maintain the formal land rights over time (e.g., property taxes and environment and
development conditions).
RIGHTS REVOCABILITY. Actions that may result in the formal land rights being revoked or extinguished and the government entity with
the authority to limit or extinguish the formal land rights.
* A precondition is a requirement that must be completed prior to the formalization or land acquisition process and is not part of the
procedure itself or linked to the formalization or acquisition of land rights. In the methodology for this report, a precondition is distinct from a
step. Thus, obtaining general recognition of indigenous status is a precondition, but if the recognition requires a showing of landholdings or is
established for land management purposes, it is a step.
A step is any interaction between two separate entities, including between the entity acquiring the land, the person the land is acquired
from, government agencies, consultants, and lawyers. This means that interactions between government agencies or offices are considered
separate steps. Intra-community interactions or internal company actions are not considered separate steps.
Table 3
Steps in Community Land Formalization Procedures in Law.
PROCEDURE NUMBER OF STEPS NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES
COMMENTS*
Brazil: Indigenous Territories 18–21 8
Brazil: Quilombola Collective Titles 15–21 6 Open-ended steps
Cambodia: Collective Land Title 11–25 5–9
Cameroon: Land Title 12–17 8–9 Open-ended steps
Chile: Article 20(b) Land Transfer 6 2 Missing implementing regulations
Côte d’Ivoire: Land Certificate 14–15 9
Guyana: Amerindian Land Title 10–12 3 Significant ambiguities in the law. Open-ended steps
India: Community Forest Rights 13–22 5
Indonesia: Customary/Adat Forest 12 12 Some steps governed at the regional level
Mozambique: DUAT Delimitation 7 1–2
Mozambique: DUAT Demarcation 10 5
Panama: Indigenous Collective Land Title 11–18 5–6
Peru: Native Community Land Title 19 7
Peru: Usufruct Contract of Forestland 20 8 Implementing regulations are enacted at the regional level
Philippines: Certificate of Ancestral Domain 54–61 19 Open-ended steps
PNG: Certificate of Title to Customary Land 10–13 5–6
Tanzania: Certificate of Village Land 3 2 Implementing regulations do not provide more detailed steps
Open-ended steps
Uganda: Certificate of Customary Occupation 14–16 5 Open-ended steps
Uganda: Group Freehold 15–17 5 Open-ended steps
Average (low and high) 14.4–17.6 6.3–6.7
Median (low and high) 12–17 5–6
Note: *Open-ended steps refer to steps that could continue indefinitely.
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complexity of land formalization processes. Often, however, one step in
the process or one institution (often a government agency) is re-
sponsible for the procedure breaking down in practice. Interagency
politics and inaction by specific administrative departments are
common sources of delays. Where third parties have competing claims
to the land, the process can breakdown, as the procedures generally do
not establish workable disputes resolution mechanisms.
In other cases, problems result from the lack of crucial im-
plementation regulations that establish a framework for formalization.
Some countries lack key government institutions. Capacity and co-
ordination issues are also common both for communities and the re-
sponsible government agencies.
3.1.2. Time and expense of the formalization process
For all 19 community procedures examined, the law does not es-
tablish overarching time frames within which the procedure must be
completed. However, legally-mandated deadlines are imposed for cer-
tain steps in most procedures, commonly related to notice require-
ments, or timelines within which oppositions or contestations must be
made. Time frames on entry of rights into a registry or on signatures of
approval are rare and, where they exist, not consistently established.
In practice, the time to complete the formalization procedures
varies significantly among communities within a country, and across
countries (Table 5). Overall, completing the procedures take from
around a year to 30 years or more. Boundary disputes with neighbors,
competing claims to the land from third parties, or opposition from
concession holders for mining, forestry, or other purposes are common
and significant sources of delay.
Lack of government capacity or prioritization is problematic.
Authorities may have insufficient budget, qualified personnel, or re-
quisite supplies. Lack of political will, commitment from local and/or
national authorities, and accountability for government staff are further
concerns. Technical requirements, such as a soil analysis in Peru re-
quired to determine what legal category the land should be classified as,
are particularly time-consuming and costly. Communities sometimes
struggle to meet requirements, due to a lack of literacy, translation is-
sues, or intra-community divisions.
Regarding expenses, no procedure has detailed provisions in law on
the costs of formalization, although 14 of the 19 procedures provide
general allocation of costs among parties. The often-high costs of land
surveying are more likely to be allocated to the government. Where
communities bear the costs of formalization, the law often establishes
some nominal fees.
In practice, costs vary. In Tanzania, the cost of obtaining a
Certificate of Village Land ranges from US$500 to $1000 per commu-
nity Byamugisha and Fulgence, 2013. In Peru, the cost for titling
agricultural land ranges from $1000 to $13,000. In Mozambique, de-
limitation costs in the early 2000s ranged from $2000 to $8000 and
between 2010 and 2012 they averaged around $13,000 De Wit and
Norfolk, 2010; Quan et al., 2013). The cost of boundary demarcation,
technical requirements and resolving conflicts where rights overlap are
often high, especially where communities are remote.
Table 4
Steps in Community Land Formalization Procedures in Practice.
PROCEDURE STEPS GOVERNMENT AGENCIES KEY BARRIES TO COMPLETING THE PROCESS
LAW PRACTICE LAW PRACTICE
Column1 Column2 Column3 Column4 Column5 Column6
Guyana: Amerindian Land 10–12 37–44 (Guidelines) 29–32 (actual
practice)
3 8–9 • Resolving conflicting concessions• Demarcation errors and disagreements over maps• Institutional disputes• Process restarts when a request is changed
Indonesia: Customary/ Adat
Forest
12 17 12 21 • Obtaining recognition as a community from the local
legislative body
• Lack of technical regulations at the national level
Mozambique: DUAT Delimitation 7 9 1–2 2 • Boundary harmonization and settling land disputes• Translating participatory map to the technical map• Issuance of certificate
Peru: Native Community Land
Title
19 28 7 12 • Resolving overlaps with concessions/productive forests• Completing registration in various cadastres• Soil analysis (potentially simplified by new laws)
Peru: Usufruct Contract of
Forestland
20 33 8 15 • Confusion over institutional responsibility• Lack of implementing regulations and guidelines
Tanzania: Certificate of Village
Land
3 18 2 5–6 • Resolving boundary conflicts• Delays in issuing documents/misplaced documents• Obtaining district level approval• Surveying (lack of capacity/expense)
Note: For Guyana Amerindian Land, recent nonbinding guidelines have been developed but not yet implemented.
Table 5
Community Land Formalization Procedures in Practice.
Source: Field research led by CIFOR, AsM Law Office, UCRT, and RRI. Comments by APA/FPP. Sources: Amerindian Land Titling Project Board, 2016; Atkinson et al.,
2016; Almås et al., 2014; Byamugisha and Fulgence, 2013; De Wit and Norfolk, 2010; Donovan et al., 2012; Fairley, 2012; Ghebru et al., 2015; GOG/OP, 2010;
Knight et al., 2013; TFCG, 2015; Quan et al., 2013, and Schreiber, 2017.
PROCEDURE COST IN TIME COST IN $ (USD) SIZE OF LAND DURATION OF
RIGHTS
REVOCABILITY
Guyana: Amerindian Land Up to∼30 years outstanding claims
(since 1960s)
No Data 259–8,288 ha (limited
data)
Unlimited 1 report: extinguished
arbitrarily
Indonesia: Customary Forest 4–15 years No Data No Data Unlimited None reported
Mozambique: Delimitation 2–3 years 2,000–13,329 < 10–500,000 ha Unlimited None reported
Peru: Native Community Land Up to 20+ years 10–25 years 1,000–13,000 19–452,735 ha Unlimited None reported
Peru: Usufruct Contract (same as above) plus 30 days–1 year No Data No Data Unlimited None reported
Tanzania: Certificate of Village
Land
1–3 years outstanding claims: 5+
years
500–1,000 39–5,172 ha Unlimited None reported
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Financing typically comes from a combination of governments, in-
ternational organizations, CSOs, NGOs, and communities themselves.
Even where under the law governments bear responsibility for paying
costs, communities often have expenses in practice and are reliant on
donor organizations to meet them.
3.1.3. Duration of the rights, requirements to maintain them, and
revocability
The rights granted to communities are mandatorily of unlimited
duration for 17 of the 19 procedures. Only under group freehold titles
in Uganda and land certificates in Côte d’Ivoire are the rights not in
perpetuity.
Of the 19 community procedures, only Côte d’Ivoire mandates af-
firmative obligations on communities to retain the recognition of their
rights, requiring that the land be under an agricultural or other op-
eration (a “mise en valeur” condition). For the three procedures in
Guyana and Uganda, government has the discretion to impose condi-
tions as it sees fit. No country requires the regular submission of land-
use or development plans.
It is common, however, for laws to include requirements related to
environmental, conservation, or land use, without clearly establishing
that the rights will be revoked if they are not met. For example, many
countries have legal provisions that, while not constituting explicit
conditions, penalize landholders who do not develop or use their land.
There is significant ambiguity in the law, however, as to what re-
quirements may result in revocation of rights if violated. For 8 proce-
dures, the law is silent as to whether or how the rights may be revoked
(implying irrevocability but without necessarily establishing it). The
remaining 11 variously have provisions allowing for revocation if a
condition of the right has been violated, the land is abandoned or left
undeveloped, or there was fraud or mistake in the allocation process.
In practice, the rights for all 6 procedures examined are granted for
the full duration specified in law (in perpetuity). And except for Guyana
(Almås et al., 2014), the research did not identify any instances of rights
being revoked once they were granted. There are examples of rights
being lost through other means, however, such as when a village is
subdivided in Tanzania which invalidates the prior Certificate of Village
Land (Schreiber, 2017).
3.1.4. Scope of the rights granted
In law, the rights granted to communities may be limited geo-
graphically, or in terms of which rights may be exercised over the land.
No community procedure had a numeric acreage ceiling or cap placed
on how much land can be formalized. However, 7 of the 12 procedures
which require a showing of historic status or land use link this re-
quirement specifically to the land that may be formalized. This means
the amount of land may be restricted to that for which communities can
meet the evidentiary requirements of historic use. Similarly, some
procedures exclude certain types or legal classifications of land, or land
that has been granted or leased to third parties. For example, 5 of the 19
procedures either exclude classified forested land or classified non-
forest land (these are legal categories that may or may not correspond
with actual geography).
In practice, government officials impose unofficial caps or arbitrary
criteria restricting the size of land granted in 5 of the 6 procedures
examined for practice. In Indonesia, Guyana, and Mozambique, officials
have refused to process applications that they consider too large, ar-
guing the area exceeds community management capacities. There are
also problems in translating maps that communities prepare to the
government cadaster.
The ability of communities to take and use natural resources
(withdrawal rights) is restricted. Many natural resources, including
minerals, hydrocarbons, water, and other high-value natural resources
are the property of the state or are public resources held in trust by the
government. In law, most communities are granted only general man-
agement rights. With some exceptions, however, subsistence rights to
water and forests are protected for communities while rights to wildlife
for subsistence purposes show greater variation and are fully guaran-
teed in only 6 procedures. Seven procedures allow for subsistence use of
certain minerals for building resources (e.g., sand and gravel). Rights to
hydrocarbons are not granted to any communities on a subsistence or
commercial basis through the formalization of land rights.
Commercial rights to trees (forests), water, wildlife, minerals, and
hydrocarbons almost universally require further government approval
or licensing. The complexity of licensing requirements varies sig-
nificantly among countries but permits and requisite forms are typically
not well adapted for collective entities (as opposed to individuals or
companies). Commercial uses of mineral resources, even at an artisanal
level, is not possible or almost always requires meeting significant li-
censing requirements, such as technical plans, fees, or forming a com-
pany or cooperative.
Finally, alienation rights are inconsistent across procedures. In law,
5 of the 19 community procedures grant communities full rights to sell
their land, 10 procedures did not give them any rights, and 4 proce-
dures allow alienability with conditions or additional procedures. Four
procedures fully grant communities the right to lease land, 6 procedures
disallow leasing, with the remainder allowing leases in some circum-
stances.
In practice, communities are not always able to exercise manage-
ment and exclusion rights to the full extent allowed by law. Many
communities are unable to exclude third parties from entering their
land or to effectively control high-value natural resources targeted by
external interests through legal and illegal means. This is linked to a
lack of protection for the right to free, prior, and informed consent
(FPIC).
Subsistence natural resource use rights, however, are generally
protected the same in practice and law with some exceptions, typically
due to encroachment by third parties or restrictions near conservation
areas. In other cases, communities enjoy some resource rights for sub-
sistence use even where the law is ambiguous or disallows such use,
principally due to lack of enforcement of laws.
Commercial use of natural resources, however, is less likely to be
exercised in practice than in law because of the difficulties obtaining
the requisite licenses. Most communities that obtain this authorization
and meet compliance requirements do so because of support from
donor organizations (CIFOR, 2016).
Alienation rights are protected more or less in practice as compared
to the law. Informal leasing, for example, occurs in Peru on a looser
basis than the law provides. In contrast, in Mozambique, leasing is al-
lowed by the law but does not commonly occur because implementing
regulations have not been developed (Cabral and Norfolk, 2016; Rose,
2014).
3.2. Company land acquisition procedures
3.2.1. Preconditions and steps
There are legally-mandated preconditions for companies in all
countries, such as registering with an investment agency. In several
countries, foreign investors must meet specific certification require-
ments or are barred from accessing the procedure. Further, for most of
the 13 company procedures surveyed for this issue, companies can only
access land in specific legal or geographic categories. In the Philippines,
only alienable lands of the public domain may be subject to agricultural
concessions.
In practice, companies find ways around restrictive preconditions
related to nationality, such as registering a domestic subsidiary.
Further, companies do not always meet preconditions associated with
legal land classification because the classifications do not always reflect
reality on the ground.
The number of procedural steps that companies face, and the
number of government agencies involved are generally higher where
national laws impose environmental licensing requirements as part of
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the land acquisition procedure or where community consultations are
required (Table 6). Technical requirements, such as land valuation, soil
maps, and land clearing permits, add further complexity.
Ten of the 13 procedures involve applications to government, while
two procedures also incorporate a bidding process. Twelve procedures
presume government ownership of the land in question, and except for
any requisite community consultations, the burden of verifying third-
party claims lies with the government. Only 6 company procedures,
incorporate community consultation around land issues, and only 3
require companies to engage in FPIC procedures. In Papua New Guinea
and Tanzania, if the land has customary owners, it must first be ac-
quired by the government, which then leases it to the investor. No
procedure requires resettlement of people living on the land prior to the
acquisition.
In practice, the number of steps companies complete to acquire
formal land rights varies significantly across companies, including
across those operating in the same country. Some companies complete
the process with fewer steps than the law requires by, for example,
abridging community consultations or failing to notify relevant gov-
ernment agencies. Other companies undertake more steps than estab-
lished in law. This variation appears to depend on company willingness
to engage with the requirements of the law or in meaningful community
consultations.
3.2.2. Time and expense of the formalization process
National laws contain few provisions governing the time or cost of
the 14 company procedures. As with communities, no procedure has an
overall time frame established in law. Step-specific deadlines are also
uncommon, with some exceptions. Time frames are typically specified
only for notice or publication and for environmental licensing re-
quirements.
In practice, the time it takes companies to acquire formal land rights
generally ranges from a few months up to between two years and five
years (Table 7). Required environmental permitting and community
consultations can be time-intensive. Processing applications and se-
curing the necessary government approvals can also extend the acqui-
sition time. Conversely, some companies find shortcuts by, for example,
undertaking inadequate community consultations (e.g., a single meeting
or approval from one community leader).
Companies are expected to bear the costs of land acquisitions in all
14 procedures, including the cost of surveying and other technical re-
quirements. They are also generally expected to pay registration fees,
although laws incentivizing investment occasionally exempt certain
companies from these fees. Procedures that include bidding (Cambodia
and the Philippines) require initial deposits as part of the bid. Initial
rent payments may also be required.
Data on company financial expenses in practice are not readily
available but the data collected suggest high expenses for obtaining
land rights. They also show that costs vary significantly depending on
how long the procedure takes, what licenses and environmental permits
are needed, the size and scope of the project, and other factors. Where
paid, the cost of bribes may also be significant. These costs, however,
should be contextualized by the overall capacity of companies, the tax
incentives and other benefits offered to companies, and the possibility
of deducting some expenses as business expenses.
3.2.3. Duration of the right, requirements to maintain it, and revocability
By law, most companies may only acquire land rights for limited
terms. Seven of the 14 company procedures have a potential life of
50–100 years and four procedures, as well as domestic investors in
Uganda, are unlimited (Table 8). The remaining procedures have am-
biguous provisions on renewal.
In practice, most concessions in the countries examined were
granted for the full duration allowed by law. In Mozambique, compa-
nies may continue operating past the expiration of the two- or five-year
provisional grants, given lack of government monitoring and capacity Ta
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to issue long-term definitive grants (Chiziane et al., 2015; CPI, 2016).
National laws impose conditions on all company procedures, except
freehold title in Uganda where imposing conditions is discretionary.
Eleven of the 14 procedures include mandatory conditions to develop
the land with a majority defining development subjectively around the
company’s own development plan or contract obligations. The others
use objective criteria with development defined in law. Other condi-
tions include payment of rent, completion of technical requirements,
implementation of community or small-holder projects, or compliance
with environmental or other laws. Violating certain conditions can re-
sult in revocation of the right for all 14 company procedures.
In practice, where companies breach conditions of a land grant,
revocations of the land rights are inconsistent. Rights are sometimes
revoked, often where projects have been abandoned. In some countries,
revocations are made in response to public outcry, or are politically
driven, instead of being based on systematic monitoring (Chiziane
et al., 2015; Land Matrix, 2018; Mandamule, 2017). Governments may
also negotiate with companies instead of revoking rights, by reducing
concession size or allowing revisions to the development plan.
3.2.4. Scope of the rights granted
Eight of the 14 company procedures do not impose a numeric cap on
the amount of land that investors may acquire (in Tanzania the law
instructs a cap to be imposed by as yet unwritten regulations). Five
procedures do impose specific caps, ranging from 500 ha for individual
citizen investors in the Philippines up to 150,000 ha (in two 75,000-
hectare plantations) for industrial forests in Indonesia. Panama restricts
tourist concessions from exceeding a certain percentage of the land on
an island.
Laws do not always clearly prohibit companies from evading these
size limitations by combining multiple concessions or using creative
ownership structures, such as shell companies. Only the three proce-
dures in Indonesian and Cambodia restrict companies from combining
multiple concessions. In practice, the laws are not effectively enforced.
Caps on concession size are avoided by companies applying for multiple
concessions or by creating subsidiaries.
In law, full management rights are granted to companies almost
universally, excepting environmental and social regulations (restric-
tions exist on clearing forests in some countries). Exclusion rights are
also fully granted in the 14 procedures, although in some instances
there are strong easement requirements mandating access to water or
other subsistence resources for neighboring communities.
The rights to commercial use of water and wildlife are typically
governed by separate legal frameworks but are available subject to a
permitting process for most procedures. The granting of forest rights,
however, varies significantly; the right is stronger where the underlying
procedure is linked specifically to forestry operations. As with com-
munities, investor commercial rights over minerals and hydrocarbons
are limited and generally require the company to have the needed ex-
pertise and complete the proper licensing processes.
Alienation rights for sale or transfer and for lease or sublease are
fully granted in law for 6 of the 14 procedures. Transfer rights are only
fully denied for industrial forests in Indonesia, and lease rights are fully
denied for the Mozambique procedure and industrial forests in
Indonesia. Several procedures allow alienation subject to government
authorization. Laws that restrict alienation do not generally prevent the
company holding the land rights to transfer shares, leaving a loophole
by which companies may effectively transfer land, even where there are
legal limitations on alienability.
In practice, companies enjoy strong management, exclusion, with-
drawal, and alienation rights. The rights to use and withdraw natural
resources on the land are occasionally exercised more freely than pro-
vided in law, especially for timber extraction. However, the data also
indicate significant variations, depending on the capacities of the
company and whether it undertakes good-faith efforts to comply with
permitting regulations. Some companies in Mozambique and IndonesiaTa
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avoid legal restrictions on selling or transferring land by transferring
shares in the holding company. Informal extralegal leases are also
common in Mozambique.
4. Comparing community and company procedures
The data collected on community and company procedures across
three continents yield five significant findings, which highlight the in-
equality between community and company procedures.
4.1. Community procedures are burdensome and inaccessible
In formalizing customary land rights, communities face complex
and sometimes insurmountable legal, technical, and evidentiary re-
quirements. For example, in Indonesia, Indigenous Peoples must first
lobby their regional legislature for formal recognition of their in-
digenous status. In Chile, indigenous communities are not eligible for
the procedure unless they possess a specified historic document. And in
Uganda, communities must incorporate themselves into an association,
elect officers, and write a constitution. In addition, formalization pro-
cedures are rarely transparent. Communities are not always able to
correct or contest government errors, obtain information, or find out
why applications are delayed or rejected. They also may be excluded
from crucial steps in the process such as boundary mapping. Procedures
are often complicated by third parties who claim competing rights to
the land, or due to border conflicts. These disputes are not well ad-
dressed in law or in practice and may effectively halt the process.
4.2. With formalization, most communities must forfeit some customary
land, lose certain customary rights, and accept new risks
In most research countries, significant areas of customary land may
be excluded in certificates or titles granted to communities. For ex-
ample, some communities cannot formalize any forested land, while
others must exclude areas of land claimed by third parties. In addition,
for all but one procedure assessed in practice, government officials
impose arbitrary caps on the size of land granted to communities.
Communities also do not receive full rights over the natural resources
on their land. Governments retain the right to allocate overlapping
concessions to high-value resources, such as timber, wildlife for trophy
hunting, minerals and hydrocarbons,3 and communities only had rights
to exercise full FPIC to these transactions in 2 out of the 19 community
procedures.
4.3. Procedures are generally more challenging for communities than
companies
Community procedures generally take years to decades to complete,
while land acquisition procedures for companies typically range from
one month to five years. Many communities are unable to formalize
their land, sometimes after decades of efforts. Company procedures can
be complex due to environmental licensing or other permitting re-
quirements, but these generally relate to commercial operations on the
land rather than the underlying land rights. In contrast, when it comes
to screening for and resolving competing claims to the land, commu-
nities are subject to stricter standards. All community procedures re-
quire a screening for third-party rights, and such third-party claims in
practice often prevent a community from successfully formalizing its
land. By contrast, only 6 of the 14 corporate land acquisition proce-
dures surveyed for this report require any form of community con-
sultation, and only 3 of those contain provisions protecting commu-
nities’ rights to FPIC. Instead, the law presumes that the government
owns the land or has the right to give it away.
4.4. Community rights are restricted in practice, but companies have
expanded opportunities, especially if they do not have strong social and
environmental commitments
The legal community land formalization procedures are narrow and
offer little flexibility and, in practice, a lack of resources and capacity
means most communities have only one opportunity (if any) to for-
malize their land. Similarly, in exercising rights over natural resources,
communities are seldom able to realize those rights to the full extent
allowed by the law. In contrast, for companies, land acquisition is fa-
cilitated by a range of legal alternatives, as well as quasilegal, extra-
legal, and illegal measures. Company engagement with key steps in the
process, such as community consultations, varies widely. Across coun-
tries, some companies exploit natural resources to which they have not
legally been granted rights, and revocations of land rights when com-
panies fail to meet conditions or comply with the law are inconsistent.
These companies therefore have a competitive advantage in obtaining
formal land rights against both communities and those companies that
comply with legal and social or environmental standards.
4.5. Regulatory and policy frameworks favor investors over community
formalization procedures
Communities receive inadequate and sporadic support from their
government, compared to dedicated and sustained support for in-
vestors. Companies often benefit from dedicated government invest-
ment centers and recruitment efforts, whereas government community
land formalization programs are often under-resourced and im-
plemented inconsistently. Some countries lack the requisite public in-
stitutions to formalize customary land rights. In Uganda, government
entities responsible for approving key steps have not been established,
making implementation of the procedure impossible in some regions.
Many communities that have formalized their land rights received ex-
ternal support, often from CSOs or NGOs. Finally, in some countries,
political and economic elites have successfully undermined community
land formalization efforts that threaten their interests. As noted,
boundary conflicts between communities and competing third-party
claims are primary sources of delays and increased costs during com-
munity land formalization. Unfair or inadequate dispute resolution
procedures allow commercial interests or local elites to prevent com-
munity land from being formalized.
5. Conclusion
In comparing the complexity of community and company proce-
dures, the research uncovered several key distinctions, to the benefit of
foreign corporations. This is the opposite of what might be expected,
given that communities are seeking to formalize long-standing cus-
tomary rights, which in some countries already have the force of law,
while companies are applying to obtain new rights. The research
highlights significant procedural challenges, encoded in the law and
realized in practice, to communities obtaining formal land rights. It also
highlights inequalities in how regulatory frameworks and im-
plementing actors treat community procedures as compared to com-
pany land acquisition procedures. There are many implications for
governments, development agencies, companies, and communities, in-
cluding the importance of clear, accessible procedures for communities
to register and document their land rights; fair and accessible conflict
resolution mechanisms to address competing third-party claims;
3 The rights to high-value, renewable and nonrenewable natural resources are
commonly governed by separate laws and government agencies, distinct from
those that govern community land. In many countries, national laws provide
communities (which hold collectively-land rights) with rights to certain natural
resources for subsistence purposes, but not for commercial use. Commercial use
of high-value natural resources by communities almost universally requires
specific government approval.
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granting communities more rights to the variety of resources on their
land; establishing avenues for communities to make complaints, appeal
decisions, and request information about the status of their applica-
tions; and establishing stronger monitoring and oversight of company
behavior.
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